

# MAGNET S2 OSINT TEAM

## S2 INTELLIGENCE REPORT

### FIFA WORLD CUP 2026 — THREAT ASSESSMENT & OPERATOR IMPACT ANALYSIS

DTG: 260608-1600z | All MAGNET Regions | Active Threat Window: June 11 – July 19, 2026

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## 1. MAGCON STATUS

MAGCON	STATUS	REGION	CATEGORY
L3 ELEVATED	Active — Tournament underway 260611–260719	ALL REGIONS — escalate host regions to L2 on QF/SF/Final dates	Mass Gathering / Security / Infrastructure / Public Health

L3 ELEVATED is assigned across all MAGNET regions for the full 39-day tournament window. The 2026 FIFA World Cup is the largest sustained mass gathering event in US history, running simultaneously across 11 major metropolitan areas. It arrives against a backdrop of active US-Iran armed conflict, a WHO-declared Ebola public health emergency, and the highest federal terrorism threat assessment for a domestic sporting event since the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics. Regions hosting Quarterfinal, Semifinal, or Final matches should escalate to L2 HIGH on those specific dates.

## 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

The FIFA World Cup 2026 presents a threat environment with no domestic precedent. The tournament's size — 104 matches, 48 nations, 11 US host cities, 39 consecutive days — creates compounding and overlapping infrastructure, security, communications, and public health stresses across every MAGNET region. Three factors distinguish this tournament from all previous US-hosted mega-events and substantially elevate the threat picture:

**Factor 1 — Active war with a participating nation:** The United States is at war with Iran, which qualified for the tournament. Iran has since withdrawn its team, but the geopolitical conditions — including confirmed Iranian state influence operations targeting the tournament and a prior arrest of an Iranian-linked operative planning attacks in Los Angeles, Arizona, and New York — create a persistent adversarial threat environment that is unprecedented for a US-hosted sporting event.

**Factor 2 — Confirmed pre-tournament security incident:** In March 2026, authorities discovered a bag containing 20 improvised explosive devices near the Liberty Memorial in Kansas City — a designated World Cup fan zone. This is not a theoretical threat; there is a confirmed IED event already associated with the tournament's footprint.

**Factor 3 — Emergency services degradation across all host cities simultaneously:** More than 400 law enforcement agencies are committed to tournament security. On any given match day, multiple host cities will have significantly reduced emergency services availability for non-tournament incidents. MAGNET operators cannot assume normal emergency response times during the tournament window.

Overall Confidence: HIGH. The threat environment described in this report is drawn from US government statements, federal agency briefings, credible private-sector threat intelligence organizations (CSIS, Recorded

Future/Insikt Group), and multi-source AP/wire reporting. The IED discovery in Kansas City is sourced to a congressional letter citing law enforcement confirmation. Seeded from OSINT submission by W9BVM; S2 verification and analytical expansion conducted independently.

### 3. THREAT DOMAIN ASSESSMENT

THREAT DOMAIN	LEVEL	ASSESSMENT	AFFECTED REGIONS
<b>Terrorism / Mass Casualty</b>	<b>L2 HIGH</b>	First World Cup in history where a co-host nation (US) is at war with a participating nation (Iran). Iranian state media branded the national team delegation 'Minab-168' — after a February 2026 US/Israeli airstrike they allege killed 168 civilians. CSIS and Recorded Future both assess Iran as the most active state-level threat actor. ISIS, lone-wolf jihadist, and domestic violent extremist threats are all assessed as elevated. Prior World Cup plots documented at 1998 (Algeria/France) and 2015 (ISIS/Stade de France). Improvised explosive device discovered near Liberty Memorial in Kansas City in March 2026 — a designated World Cup fan zone.	All host regions — especially LA, Seattle (Iran group stage venues)
<b>Transportation Infrastructure</b>	<b>L2 HIGH</b>	The Northeast I-95 corridor and Amtrak NEC will operate at or near capacity for the full 39-day window. Dallas/Arlington (AT&T Stadium) has no direct rail — total vehicle dependency for 9 matches. Kansas City (Arrowhead) similarly has no light rail. Security cordons around venues will close or restrict normal vehicle routes on match days. Emergency services access to host venue areas will be degraded during match operations.	MR01, NE Corridor, Texas, Kansas City
<b>Communications / Spectrum Congestion</b>	<b>L3 ELEVATED</b>	Simultaneous presence of millions of international visitors with foreign SIM cards and roaming devices will stress cellular capacity in host city cores. FBI Joint Operations Centers will be active in all 11 host cities, consuming significant federal comms bandwidth. Security perimeters will include drone bans enforced by counter-UAS systems — RF jamming or counter-drone emissions may affect amateur radio operations near venues. MAGNET operators near stadiums on match days should anticipate degraded cellular and possible RF interference.	All host regions — worse near venues on match days
<b>Public Health</b>	<b>L3 ELEVATED</b>	Active Ebola (Sudan strain) outbreak in Congo and Uganda — WHO declared public health emergency of international concern. DRC fan travel to the US is barred under an entry restriction. Congolese national team required 21-day quarantine. Active measles surge in multiple source countries. Mass gatherings in enclosed or semi-enclosed venues accelerate respiratory illness transmission. US has withdrawn from WHO, complicating real-time international disease intelligence sharing — CDC and Georgetown University Health Security Operations Center issuing daily situation reports to state/local health officials as a substitute.	All host regions — stadium corridors highest risk
<b>Emergency Services Surge</b>	<b>L3 ELEVATED</b>	More than 400 law enforcement agencies are engaged across 11 host cities. \$625M in federal FEMA grants distributed, plus \$250M specifically for counter-drone operations. Local emergency services in host cities will be heavily committed to venue security on match days, reducing response capacity for non-tournament emergencies in the same timeframe. Secondary host locations (fan camps, base camps, team hotels) in smaller cities and suburbs may have insufficient security and emergency resources — federal officials have specifically flagged this gap.	All host regions and surrounding communities
<b>Civil Unrest / Counter-</b>	<b>L3 ELEVATED</b>	The Iran-US war and the tournament's geopolitical	All host regions;

<p><b>Protest</b></p>	<p><b>L3 ELEVATED</b></p>	<p>backdrop create conditions for politically motivated protest activity at or near host venues. Iranian influence operations have promoted #NoUSHosts and #GoalsNotGuns hashtags. Domestic anti-immigration sentiment and the tournament's international visitor profile may generate tension in communities hosting team base camps and fan zones outside major cities. No confirmed organized civil unrest plots as of report DTG, but conditions are permissive.</p>	<p>elevated near team base camps</p>
<p><b>Cyber / Influence Operations</b></p>	<p><b>L3 ELEVATED</b></p>	<p>Russia has targeted every Olympics in the past decade with cyber operations. Iranian influence actors are actively engaged in anti-hosting narrative operations. Financially motivated threat actors are exploiting heightened geopolitical tensions and global tournament visibility. Recorded Future (Insikt Group) has documented active Iranian state and state-affiliated promotion of destabilizing narratives. Phishing, ticketing fraud, and counterfeit merchandise operations are standard mass-gathering cyber threats at scale.</p>	<p>All regions; MAGNET network operators should be vigilant</p>
<p><b>Airport / Air Travel Disruption</b></p>	<p><b>L4 HEIGHTENED</b></p>	<p>International arrival volumes at gateway airports (EWR, LAX, ATL, MIA, ORD, IAH) will be significantly elevated for the full tournament window. Hartsfield-Jackson (ATL) is already the world's busiest airport — Semifinal week will test capacity limits. DHS has signaled willingness to pull CBP officers from EWR to support Delaney Hall security, which could create secondary air travel delays at Newark. MAGNET operators with travel plans through these airports should build in significant additional dwell time.</p>	<p>MR01, Atlanta, Miami, Houston, LA</p>

**KEY INDICATORS TO MONITOR**

- Federal threat posture changes (DHS, FBI, NCTC public advisories)
- Venue-area arrests / suspicious package reports
- Protest mobilization near fan zones or team base camps
- RF interference reports near stadiums from counter-UAS or JOC operations
- EMS mutual-aid activation requests in host cities
- Public health advisories tied to travel clusters or mass gathering venues

## 4. REGION-SPECIFIC THREAT & IMPACT ASSESSMENT

The following assessment covers threat impacts specific to each MAGNET region with a host venue. Operators in non-host regions should note that transportation, public health, and communications impacts extend well beyond the immediate host metro areas.

REGION	PRIMARY THREATS / OPERATOR IMPACTS	PEAK RISK WINDOW
<b>MR01 Newark/NJ</b>	World Cup Final July 19 brings unprecedented global media presence, security lockdown, and transportation gridlock to the MetLife/East Rutherford area. EWR airport at maximum international arrival capacity. Ongoing Delaney Hall civil unrest (separate active S2 IR) adds compounding stress to MR01 law enforcement and emergency services. PATH/NJ Transit/I-95 NJ Turnpike near capacity from July 14 forward. Operators should treat July 18–19 as a near-blackout period for normal movement in the NY/NJ metro.	<b>July 14–19 (Final week) — L2 HIGH recommended</b>
MR09 San Diego/LA	SoFi Stadium (Inglewood) hosted Iran's group stage games in the original draw. Iran has withdrawn from the tournament — Group G slots will be reassigned or forfeited, reducing but not eliminating the Iranian-linked threat vectors in LA. US opener June 12 generates immediate high-traffic impact. Quarterfinal July 10 is the regional peak. I-5/I-405 corridor congestion extends into San Diego County on LA match days. LAX international arrivals elevated throughout tournament.	June 12 (US opener); July 10 (QF)
<b>Midwest Kansas City</b>	Sole Midwest host city bears the full regional logistical burden. Confirmed IED discovery near Liberty Memorial (World Cup fan zone) in March 2026 — the most concrete pre-tournament security incident identified in this report. No direct transit to Arrowhead Stadium — total highway dependency. I-70/I-435 heavily congested on match days. Secondary team base camp locations throughout the region may have insufficient security resources per federal assessment.	<b>Group stage through QF July 11; IED history warrants L2</b>
South Atlanta	Hartsfield-Jackson (ATL) is the primary international connection hub for the entire tournament — already the world's busiest airport, now processing substantially elevated international volumes. ATL congestion creates cascading delays for MAGNET operators connecting through the airport for non-tournament purposes. Mercedes-Benz Stadium Semifinal (July 15) generates maximum regional law enforcement commitment, degrading emergency services availability for non-tournament emergencies.	<b>Group stage 6/15+; Semifinal 7/15 — L2 recommended</b>
<b>Texas</b>	AT&T Stadium in Arlington hosts 9 matches — no rail access, total vehicle dependency creating severe I-30/SH-360 congestion on every match day from June 14 through Semifinal July 14. Dallas and Houston together create sustained Texas-wide interstate pressure for 5+ weeks. Match day emergency services availability in Arlington is significantly reduced — AT&T Stadium area is effectively inaccessible for normal emergency response during events.	<b>June 14 through Semifinal 7/14 — sustained elevated</b>
South Miami	Primary gateway for Latin American and Caribbean international fans — MIA and FLL airports sustain elevated international arrivals throughout the full 39-day window. Hard Rock Stadium hosts both a Quarterfinal (July 11) and Third-Place match (July 18) — two back-to-back high-profile events in the final tournament week, creating sequential peak stress periods with insufficient recovery time for local infrastructure between them.	<b>QF July 11; 3rd place July 18 — back-to-back peaks</b>
<b>Northeast Corridor</b>	Boston–Philadelphia–NY/NJ functions as a continuous 39-day mass gathering corridor. Amtrak NEC and I-95 will operate at or near capacity from tournament onset. The six-day QF-through-Final sequence (July 9 Boston QF through July 19 NY/NJ Final) represents the most sustained infrastructure stress period of the entire tournament. Operators planning NEC rail travel during this window should book well in advance and identify alternate routes.	<b>Sustained June–July; peak July 9–19</b>

## 5. OPERATOR GUIDANCE — MAGNET PREPAREDNESS

CONCERN	OPERATOR GUIDANCE
<b>Movement near host venues</b>	Treat a 2–3 mile radius around any host stadium as effectively inaccessible on match days. Security cordons, vehicle restrictions, and law enforcement presence will make normal transit through these corridors impractical. Plan alternate routes now.
<b>RF / comms environment</b>	Counter-drone operations (\$250M federal investment) and FBI JOC communications infrastructure will be active near all 11 host venues. MAGNET operators with repeaters or HF operations near host venues should monitor for unusual interference. Cellular congestion near stadiums on match days will degrade digital comms tools.
<b>Emergency services availability</b>	Local emergency services in host cities will have degraded availability for non-tournament calls on match days — law enforcement and EMS assets are committed to venue security. In a genuine emergency near a host venue on a match day, expect significantly extended response times. Self-sufficiency and mutual aid posture should be elevated.
<b>Public health precautions</b>	Operators attending matches or fan zones should observe standard mass-gathering precautions: hand hygiene, avoid symptomatic individuals, maintain situational awareness regarding health advisories. Ebola risk at venues is assessed as low — measles and respiratory illness represent the more realistic transmission concerns in mass gathering settings.
<b>Secondary locations / base camps</b>	Team base camps and fan zones in smaller cities and suburbs adjacent to host metros are specifically identified by federal officials as under-resourced for security. These locations may attract protest activity or threat actors who anticipate lighter security footprints than the main stadiums. MAGNET operators in these areas should maintain heightened awareness.
<b>MR01 — compounding threats</b>	MR01 faces simultaneous elevated threat loads from two active S2 intelligence requirements: (1) ongoing Delaney Hall civil unrest at 451 Doremus Ave, Newark; (2) World Cup Final week operations at MetLife Stadium. These are geographically separate but compete for the same law enforcement, emergency services, and transportation resources in the region. MR01 operators should treat July 14–19 as the highest-risk operational window of the year.

## 6. S2 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All regions: Assign L3 ELEVATED now. Pre-position go-kits, review alternate routes, and identify non-congested communication paths in advance of June 11 tournament onset.
2. MR01: Treat July 14–19 as the highest-risk operational window of the year. Delaney Hall civil unrest and World Cup Final operations create compounding stress on the same regional resources. Avoid the Doremus Ave corridor and the MetLife/East Rutherford corridor simultaneously during this period.
3. Kansas City / Midwest: Elevate to L2 HIGH immediately given the confirmed March 2026 IED discovery near a World Cup fan zone. This is an active threat indicator, not a theoretical concern.
4. All operators near host venues: Map counter-drone TFR (Temporary Flight Restrictions) and RF-sensitive zones around stadiums before operating HF or VHF/UHF equipment in those areas. Contact ARRL and FCC resources for updated spectrum advisories as the tournament progresses.
5. Monitor the Georgetown University / MedStar Health Security Operations Center daily situation reports for public health developments. MAGNET S2 will track and report any threat-level changes for Ebola or other infectious disease developments that cross the low-risk threshold.

6. Flag as a standing S2 intelligence requirement through July 19, 2026. S2 will produce delta updates for any significant threat developments — terrorism alerts, civil unrest escalation, public health advisories, or infrastructure disruption events — across host regions.

## 7. SOURCE ATTRIBUTION

Seeded from OSINT submission by W9BVM. S2 verification and analytical expansion conducted against the following sources:

- [CSIS — The Terrorist Threat to the 2026 World Cup \(May 2026\)](#)
- [Recorded Future / Insikt Group — Threats to the 2026 FIFA World Cup](#)
- [AP / NBC Philadelphia — World Cup Security Challenge \(June 2026\)](#)
- [ESPN — World Cup Security: Unprecedented Challenge \(June 2026\)](#)
- [AP / WUSF — Security Planners Brace for Unprecedented Threats \(June 2026\)](#)
- [Fox 13 Seattle — Federal Officials Outline World Cup Security Plan \(June 2026\)](#)
- [CNN — World Cup Testing the Public Health Playbook \(May 2026\)](#)
- [CNBC — World Cup 2026: Health Officials Focused on Ebola, Measles \(June 2026\)](#)
- [Rep. Alford / House — World Cup Security Funding Letter, IED Kansas City \(March 2026\)](#)
- [Al Jazeera — Iran Participation, Visa Ban, Mexico Violence \(March 2026\)](#)
- [Flash Score / Reuters — Iranian Sports Minister: Iran Cannot Participate \(2026\)](#)
- [FIFA — Official World Cup 2026 Venue Information](#)

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